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THE HORNE DILEMMA: PROTECTING PROPERTY’S RICHNESS 
AND FRONTIERS 
LYNDA L. BUTLER∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 In a 2015 decision, the Supreme Court concluded that real and 
personal property should not be treated differently under the 
Takings Clause and that a government condition requiring raisin 
growers, in certain years, to reserve a percentage of their crop 
for the government to manage in noncompetitive venues was a 
per se physical taking. The decision to treat both real and 
personal property as equally worthy of protection under the 
Takings Clause has merit given the weak historical evidence 
suggesting stronger protection for land and the importance of 
personal property to income generation and capital development 
in a modern society. What does not make sense is the Court’s 
continued expansion of its per se physical takings concept to 
govern many types of property and regulatory settings.  Both real 
and personal property come in many sizes, shapes, and colors. 
Takings analysis should not ignore differences in the types of 
property, nor in the complexities of the various property settings. 
 Under a per se approach, those differences do not matter. 
Under a per se approach, the Court’s physical takings analysis is 
simplistic and one-dimensional: did the government physically 
appropriate, seize, or invade private property without payment of 
just compensation? Generally left out of the equation is any 
consideration of the public interest or third-party concerns, 
regardless of their importance or their role in shaping the 
property interest. Nor does a physical appropriation actually 
have to occur. The per se physical taking may instead be more 
conceptual than actual or may involve one right in a bundle of 
rights, still leaving the property owner with other rights. In its 
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drive for clarity and simplicity, the Court thus has posed a 
serious dilemma for takings jurisprudence: the difficult task of 
solidifying constitutional protection for all types of property with 
an all-encompassing, absolute rule that can provide sufficient 
predictive value for the complex contexts of modern-day property. 
What the Court’s approach overlooks is property’s ability to 
evolve and provide order for emerging resources and new forms 
of property. What the Court’s approach overlooks is the need to 
develop constitutional principles that reflect property’s richness 
and frontiers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the 2015 decision Horne v. USDA,1 the Supreme Court made two 
significant rulings.  The Court first concluded that real and personal 
property should not be treated differently under the Takings Clause,2 
reasoning that early practices and precedent did not support such a 
distinction.3  Perhaps more significantly, the Court then found the 
government requirement that raisin growers, in certain years, reserve a 
percentage of their crop for the government to manage in noncompetitive 
venues to be a per se physical taking.4  The Court’s reasoning behind the 
                                                          
 1.  135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015). 
 2.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 3.  Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2425–28. 
 4.  Id. at 2430–31. 
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latter ruling focused on the control that a government entity had over the 
regulated raisins and its ability to require the transfer of the raisins.5  Both 
conclusions could have far-reaching implications for constitutionally 
protected property and for the countless government programs regulating 
property.  The rulings also collectively cast serious doubt on the differences 
between regulatory and physical takings. 
The decision to treat both real and personal property as equally worthy 
of protection under the Takings Clause has merit.  Both the practices and 
the rhetoric of takings cases suggest that personal and real property were 
protected under the Takings Clause.  The historical evidence suggesting 
stronger constitutional protection of land is weak and reflects a bygone era 
when land was the main source of wealth.  Early practices certainly indicate 
that the Court found compensable takings for personal as well as real 
property, at least when the property had value.6  Some of the traditional 
rhetoric surrounding the Takings Clause supports a special link between 
land and the liberty or autonomy interests of the individual owner,7 but 
many types of property now help to promote those interests. 
The conclusion that personal property is equally deserving, however, 
does not justify ignoring the differences between real and personal property 
and between subcategories of property in conducting a takings analysis.  
The decision to apply the per se physical takings test to the reserve 
requirement does just that.  This decision potentially expands the realm of 
the per se physical taking to include even some non-trespassory regulatory 
settings.  Based on Horne, for example, a condition on entry into a 
regulated market established to protect price and encourage production 
could be converted into a physical taking if the government bars access to 
stored goods in enforcing the condition.  Ignoring the wide variation among 
different types of property overlooks the complexities of context that shape 
the development of new property interests.  Personal property, in particular, 
covers a wide range of resources and interests that are limited only by 
human ingenuity and creativity.  While real property interests are tied to the 
land, personal property may be tangible or intangible, newly discovered or 
created, unable to be occupied except conceptually through the law, 
perishable or long-lasting, or nonrivalrous despite exclusive rights.  
Personal property includes tangible goods, pets and livestock, agricultural 
                                                          
 5.  Id. at 2428. 
 6.  Early on, for example, owners of unimproved land did not always receive compensation 
when their land was condemned by the government.  See McClenachan v. Curwen, 6 Binn. 509, 
513 (Pa. 1802) (“[B]ut as by the law of 1700, although a compensation is directed to be made for 
the improved land of any person, . . . yet as to the woodland or unimproved ground, there is no 
compensation to be made . . . .”). 
 7.  See Eduardo Moisès Peñalver, Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference for 
Landownership in Regulatory Takings Law, 31 ECOL. L.Q. 227, 246–50 (2004) (evaluating the 
Court’s distinction between real and personal property in takings law).  
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products, stocks, bank accounts, patents, literary creations, a person’s 
identity or image, first-in-time broadcasts, email, software, business 
operations, goodwill and stock-in-trade, commercial paper, security 
interests, proprietary information, and so on.  The differences between the 
types of property relate to the nature of the asset subject to the property 
interest, to the property uses that have developed in a particular resource, 
and to the legal regimes defining and managing the interests. 
Under a per se approach, these differences do not matter.  Under a per 
se approach, the Court’s physical takings analysis is simplistic and one-
dimensional: did the government physically appropriate, seize, or invade 
private property without payment of just compensation?  Generally left out 
of the equation is any consideration of the public interest or third-party 
concerns, regardless of their importance or their role in shaping emerging 
property interests.8  Nor does a physical appropriation actually have to 
occur after Horne (where the property owner kept possession of the raisins).  
The per se physical taking may instead be more conceptual than actual or 
may involve one right in a bundle of rights, still leaving the property owner 
with other rights.9   
Providing logically consistent legal principles for new or complex 
contexts is assumed to flow from the simplicity of the Court’s per se rule.  
In its drive for clarity and simplicity, the Court thus has posed a serious 
dilemma for takings jurisprudence: the difficult task of solidifying 
constitutional protection for all types of property with an all-encompassing, 
absolute rule that can provide sufficient predictive value for the complex 
contexts of modern-day property.  Yet, instead of clarity, the Court in 
Horne creates confusion about the logic of its precedent, about the 
transition between physical and regulatory takings, and about the 
applicability of a simple, absolute rule to complex forms of property and 
regulatory settings.  What the Court’s quest for clarity and simplicity misses 
is property’s ability to evolve and provide order for emerging resources and 
property forms.  What it misses is the need to develop constitutional 
principles that protect property’s richness and frontiers. 
I.  THE HORNE DECISION 
The regulatory program challenged in Horne was developed under the 
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937.10  The Act authorized the 
                                                          
 8.  The Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), defined a 
categorical or per se taking as “compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest 
advanced in support of the restraint.”  Id. at 1016.  
 9.  See Lynda L. Butler, The Governance Function of Constitutional Property, 48 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1687, 1695–1700, 1757–67 (2015) (comparing the crystallization of modern 
physical takings analysis with the complexity of traditional physical takings analysis). 
 10.  Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. §§ 602–674 (2012).  
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Secretary of Agriculture to adopt orders to stabilize markets for particular 
agricultural products by promoting an adequate supply for consumers and a 
reasonable income for the farmers.11  One such order established the Raisin 
Administrative Committee (“RAC”) to promote stability in the raisin 
market by controlling supply and maintaining prices.12  The means used by 
the RAC to achieve this goal was a requirement that, in certain years, raisin 
growers set aside a percentage of their crop for the RAC to manage and 
control.  Described as a “Government entity” by the Horne Court,13 the 
RAC determined the percentage based on current and past market 
conditions.14 
Raisin growers typically ship their crop to raisin handlers, who then 
physically set aside the raisins to be held in reserve (“reserve raisins”).  
After segregating the reserve raisins, the handlers pack and sell the 
remaining raisins (“free-tonnage raisins”), paying the growers only for the 
free-tonnage raisins.  The RAC decides how to dispose of the reserve 
raisins after considering market conditions for current and prior years and 
has the power to order handlers to transfer the reserve crop.15  Authorized 
disposal options include sale in secondary markets not competitive with 
free-tonnage raisins (for example, as table grapes for juice or wine 
production) or in export outlets, direct sale to federal agencies or identified 
foreign governments, charitable donations, releases to growers agreeing to 
decrease their production, and by other means.16  Raisin Administrative 
Committee sales to handlers must maximize producer returns and 
                                                          
 11.  7 U.S.C. §§ 601, 602; see also Alan B. Morrison, Response, Horne v. Department of 
Agriculture, GEO. WASH. L. REV. DOCKET (June 22, 2015), http://www.gwlr.org/horne-v-dept-of-
agriculture/.  
 12.  7 C.F.R. § 989.26 (2015).  Raisins are especially vulnerable to supply fluctuations and to 
changing weather. 
 13.  Horne v. USDA, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2015).  Consisting mainly of growers and 
handlers, the Raisin Administrative Committee operates under the Secretary of Agriculture and is 
responsible for such duties as acting as an intermediary between the Secretary and any producer, 
packer, dehydrator, or bargaining association; investigating compliance; and establishing rules and 
procedures.  7 C.F.R. §§ 989.26–989.39 (2015); see also Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 11, Horne v. USDA, 2009 
WL 4895362 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2009) (No. 1:08-CV-01549-LJO-SMS) (“The RAC is an entity 
created by the Government.  Its decision-making body is made up of paid staff, and 
representatives from raisin packers, raisin growers under contract to raisin packers, and 
independent raisin growers.”).  But see 7 C.F.R. § 989.39 (2015) (explaining that RAC members 
and alternates are not to be compensated, with the exception of expenses approved by the 
committee); id. §§ 989.79–989.80 (describing how expenses are paid by levying assessments 
made onto the handlers). 
 14.  7 C.F.R. § 989.54 (2015) (discussing trade demand and calculation of preliminary, 
interim, and final free and reserve percentages by considering such factors as the estimated 
tonnage held by producers and handlers, quality and modifications of minimum grade standards, 
world raisin supply and demand, and trends in consumer income). 
 15.  Id. § 989.67(a). 
 16.  Id. § 989.67(b); Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2430 (quoting Brief for the Respondent at 32, Horne 
v. USDA, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015) (No. 14-275)). 
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disposition of the reserve raisins.17  Raisin growers retain the right to 
receive any net proceeds from the RAC sales after administrative expenses 
and subsidies for export handlers are deducted.18 
The economic impact of the reserve requirement has varied from year 
to year. According to the government, net proceed distributions to 
producers occurred in forty-two of the forty-nine years of the program’s 
operation.19  In the years contested by the Hornes, the net proceeds were 
less than the cost of producing the crop in one year and were nothing in the 
other year.20  The percentage of reserve raisins for those years amounted to 
forty-seven percent in one year and thirty percent in the other.21 
The challengers in Horne are both raisin growers and handlers.  In 
2002, they refused to set aside the required raisins.  When the government 
sent trucks to their facility to pick up the reserve crop, the Hornes refused 
entry.  The government then assessed a fine of about $480,000 for the 
market value of the missing raisins, as well as a penalty of over $200,000.  
The Hornes brought suit, alleging an unconstitutional taking of their 
property.22 
The Ninth Circuit ruled for the government, concluding that the 
reserve requirement did not constitute a taking of the Hornes’ property.23  
The court rejected the Hornes’ argument that the requirement was a per se 
physical taking, explaining that the regulatory restriction was more properly 
analyzed under regulatory takings principles.24 According to the Ninth 
Circuit, “the Takings Clause affords less protection to personal than to real 
property.”25  Further, because the Hornes still retained the right to receive 
the net proceeds from the sale of the reserve raisins, the requirement did not 
totally divest the Hornes of their property interests.26  Looking to the land 
use exaction context, the Ninth Circuit then applied standards governing 
conditions imposed in the land use permitting process to the reserve 
                                                          
 17.  7 C.F.R § 989.67(d)(1). 
 18.  Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2424; 7 C.F.R. § 989.66(h) (2015). 
 19.  See Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2439 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Letter from Donald B. 
Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor Gen., to Scott S. Harris, Clerk of Court (Apr. 29, 2015)).  
 20.  Id. at 2424 (majority opinion). 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 2424–25.  
 23.  Horne v. USDA, 750 F.3d 1128, 1144 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 24.  Id. at 1139, 1141. 
 25.  Id. at 1139.  Relying on the decision in Lucas, the Ninth Circuit drew a distinction 
between real and personal property protections by contrasting the amount of government control 
exerted over each.  Id. at 1139–40.  The court reasoned that because a State traditionally executed 
a higher degree of control over commercial dealings and economic concerns, personal property 
received fewer protections, and indeed, the possibility of losing all economic use of that personal 
property should even be expected.  Id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1027–28 (1992)). 
 26.  Id. at 1140. 
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requirement.27  Under those standards, the means used—the reserve 
requirement—benefitted the Hornes by supporting the regulated market, 
thus protecting the price of free-tonnage raisins, and also was proportionally 
related to the public interest in market stability.28  In essence, the Ninth 
Circuit viewed the reserve requirement as a fee for voluntarily entering and 
benefitting from a regulated market. 
The Supreme Court rejected both the analysis and the conclusion of 
the Ninth Circuit.  Instead of providing less protection for personal 
property, the Court decided that personal property was equally worthy of 
constitutional protection.  Instead of analyzing the reserve requirement 
under regulatory takings principles, the Court evaluated the regulatory 
restriction under the physical takings concept.  Instead of balancing benefits 
and losses to raisin growers from the regulatory program in determining 
whether a taking existed, the Court simply focused on whether the 
government action constituted a physical appropriation of the Hornes’ 
property.29 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts first concluded that 
personal property should receive the same protection as real property from 
direct physical appropriations.  As the Chief Justice explained: 
Nothing in the text or history of the Takings Clause, or our 
precedents, suggests that the rule is any different when it comes 
to appropriation of personal property.  The Government has a 
categorical duty to pay just compensation when it takes your car, 
just as when it takes your home.30 
He found support in the historical English law tradition of the Magna Carta, 
which protected crops and other provisions from seizure without 
compensation.31  This tradition also was reflected in colonial and early 
statehood practices, which similarly compensated property owners when 
government seized their supplies.  Indeed, military seizures of privately 
owned provisions by the English and American armies during the 
                                                          
 27.  Id. at 1141–42. 
 28.  Id. at 1143.  This analysis applied the standards and principles of the regulatory takings 
cases dealing with land use exactions, Nollan and Dolan.  The Ninth Circuit likened the Hornes’ 
situation to one involving a use restriction imposed in a land use permitting process.  Rather than 
forcing a seizure of the Hornes’ crops, the Secretary imposed a condition on their sale—a 
condition that only exists once the Hornes voluntarily introduced their crops into the stream of 
commerce.  The Hornes could have just as easily refused to send their raisins into interstate 
commerce, selected different crops, or chosen not to dry their grapes.  Id. at 1141–43 (relying on 
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 
(1994)).  The Ninth Circuit relied on three primary similarities to justify its comparison: the 
presence of a conditional exaction, the conditional grant of a government benefit in exchange, and 
the choice facing the property owner.  Horne, 750 F.3d at 1143. 
 29.  Horne v. USDA, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–29 (2015).  
 30.  Id. at 2426. 
 31.  Id.  
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Revolutionary War later led to calls for constitutional protection.32  Further, 
since the 1800s, the Court’s precedent has protected personal property from 
government seizures without payment of just compensation.33 
Chief Justice Roberts thus declined to extend the distinction made by 
the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council between real and 
personal property in evaluating whether a regulatory taking existed.34  In 
Lucas, the Court stated that the “State’s traditionally high degree of control 
over commercial dealings” involving personal property meant that an owner 
of personal property should be “aware of the possibility that new regulation 
might even render his property economically worthless”—“at least if the 
property’s only economically productive use is sale or manufacture for 
sale.”35  The Lucas Court, however, stressed that applying such a limitation 
to land was “inconsistent with the historical compact” of the Takings 
Clause.36  The Horne majority refused to extend the different treatment of 
real and personal property to the direct physical appropriation setting, 
stressing that Lucas was not a physical takings case.37 
In concluding that the reserve requirement clearly constituted a 
physical taking, the majority stressed that the requirement involved both the 
physical surrender of the raisins and the transfer of title to the RAC.38  
Though the reserve raisins sometimes remained in the possession of the 
handlers, the reserve raisins were always segregated from the free-tonnage 
raisins and held “for the account” of the government.39  Further, the RAC 
could dispose of the reserve raisins “as it wishe[d].”40  In the majority’s 
view, the reserve requirement thus deprived raisin growers of their “entire 
‘bundle’ of property rights . . .—‘the rights to possess, use and dispose of’” 
the raisins, “with the exception of the speculative hope” of receiving “some 
residual proceeds.”41 
                                                          
 32.  Id.  In addition to the military seizures, some have theorized that early statehood efforts 
to reallocate debt from creditors to debtors led to the eventual adoption of the Takings Clause.  
See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 147–49 (1990). 
 33.  See, e.g., James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357–58 (1882) (declaring that a patent 
conferred an exclusive property interest that could not be appropriated by government without just 
compensation).  
 34.  Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427–28 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 
(1992)). 
 35.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–28. 
 36.  Id. at 1028. 
 37.  Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427. 
 38.  Id. at 2428. 
 39.  Id.; see also 7 C.F.R. § 989.66 (2015) (stating “reserve tonnage transferred to a handler 
by the committee shall be held by him for the account of the committee”). 
 40.  Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2428.  
 41.  Id. (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)). 
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The Court also rejected government arguments that the takings inquiry 
should weigh the economic impact of the regulatory program, balancing the 
benefits to the growers of voluntarily participating in the regulated market 
against the growers’ loss of control and sometimes net proceeds.42  
According to Chief Justice Roberts, a physical takings analysis does not ask 
whether economically viable use remains but rather focuses on the physical 
appropriation of the property.43  “[A] contingent interest of indeterminate 
value” does not negate the fact that a physical appropriation has occurred, at 
least not when “the value of the interest depends on the discretion of the 
taker.”44  In the majority’s view, these arguments “confuse” the per se 
physical takings inquiry with regulatory takings analysis.45  While the 
existence of an economically viable use could prevent a regulatory 
restriction from being a regulatory taking, it would not save even a partial 
physical appropriation from being a physical taking.46  The Court also 
refused to treat participation in the regulated raisin market as a reason to 
view the reserve requirement as part of a voluntary exchange.  As the Court 
explained, ordinary, basic uses of property—such as selling an agricultural 
product in the market—do not qualify as special government benefits that 
can be used as leverage to secure a “waiver of constitutional protection.”47 
The Horne decision raises more questions than it resolves.  The Court 
declared that personal property is as worthy as real property of protection 
from physical takings, yet it left intact—and without explanation—the 
different treatment recognized in Lucas for regulatory takings.  The Court 
further concluded that the reserve requirement constituted a physical taking, 
even though simply prohibiting the sale of the reserves would not have been 
a physical taking but would have had a worse economic impact on 
growers—a prohibition on sale would have deprived the growers of any 
proceeds from the reserves, but it would not have required a transfer of 
control to the RAC.  The Court explained that the Constitution “is 
concerned with means as well as ends.”48  This logic is contrary to the more 
complex approach of traditional courts to physical takings.  The traditional 
analysis “applied a number of factors to measure how close the government 
interference was to an actual, direct physical occupation or 
appropriation . . . includ[ing] entry, practical ouster, loss or destruction of 
use, intent to repeat, and destruction of value.”49 
                                                          
 42.  Id. at 2428–29. 
 43.  Id. at 2429 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 
U.S. 302, 323 (2002)).  
 44.  Id.  
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id.  
 47.  Id. at 2430–31. 
 48.  Id. at 2428. 
 49.  Butler, supra note 9, at 1757. 
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The Horne majority also ignored a different approach to physical 
takings announced in a 2012 decision, as well as some judicial resistance to 
the expansion of rules-based tests.50  The 2012 decision, Arkansas Game & 
Fish Commission v. United States,51 rejected application of the per se rule 
to government-authorized flooding that was temporary and not necessarily 
recurring, instead using a “more complex balancing process.”52  That 
process weighed the nature, duration, and foreseeability of the government 
invasion with the harm to the landowner, including interference with 
reasonable, investment-backed expectations.53  Although the Court in 
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission clarified that a physical taking could 
arise even when government-induced flooding was temporary, the decision 
clearly signals that the per se approach is not the only test for physical 
takings.54  The Court in Horne suggests otherwise, treating the per se 
approach as the only test that should be applied to government-mandated 
physical transfers of regulated personal property. 
Further, by framing the claim against the regulatory restriction as a per 
se physical taking, the Horne majority blurs the distinction between 
regulatory and physical takings and enables property owners to circumvent 
a number of principles that previously made a regulatory takings conclusion 
more difficult to reach.  The per se physical takings approach, for example, 
gets around the “as a whole” standard that the Court adopted to prevent 
conceptual severance in a regulatory setting.  In Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City,55 the Court declared that it would 
evaluate the impact of a regulatory action by examining the property as a 
whole and would not treat the regulated interest as a “discrete segment[].”56  
Otherwise, property owners could manipulate the interest they claimed to 
be taken, narrowing it to just the regulated portion and increasing the 
likelihood of a Lucas taking involving a total wipeout of economically 
                                                          
 50.  See Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience of Property, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 847, 888 (2013) 
(proposing that the Nollan and Dolan rules-based expansion has stoked judicial resistance in lower 
courts and even subsequent Supreme Court decisions due to the difficulty of “applying any single 
or formulistic vision of constitutional property to the complex and variable situations involving 
ordinary property”).  
 51.  133 S. Ct. 511 (2012). 
 52.  Id. at 521 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 
n.12 (1982)). 
 53.  Id. at 522–23. 
 54.  For a discussion of potential problems raised by Arkansas Game & Fish Commission and 
a proposed analytical approach distinguishing between the exclusion and governance strategies to 
property, see Butler, supra note 9, at 1714–20. 
 55.  438 U.S. 104 (1978).  
 56.  Id. at 130–31.  This approach has been reiterated by subsequent decisions.  See, e.g., 
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326–27 (2002) 
(rejecting the temporal severance argument and concluding that a building moratorium did not 
cause a total economic loss for the period when the moratorium applied).  
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viable use.57  If, instead, physical takings analysis is applied to a regulation 
involving the transfer of a part, the “as a whole” perspective does not 
matter.  As the Horne Court explains, even a permanent physical 
appropriation of just a few inches of land is considered a per se physical 
taking.58  Under this analysis, when the property is a fungible product like 
raisins, a government requirement to physically reserve and transfer just a 
small amount of raisins—say 1%—would be a physical taking.  The fact 
that the raisin grower still had 99% of her crop would not be considered.  
Under the Court’s analysis, the amount of free-tonnage raisins simply 
would not matter. 
The physical takings approach of the Horne decision also allows the 
Court to ignore the context surrounding the reserve requirement, including 
the fairness dimension of regulatory takings analysis addressed through 
such concepts as average reciprocity of advantage and evening out of the 
benefits and burdens of regulatory life.59  When a permanent physical 
appropriation exists, the per se approach focuses entirely on the owner.  The 
benefits to the owner of being in a protected market are irrelevant to 
determining whether a physical taking exists.  The windfalls received, for 
example, from being in a stable market with price controls would not be 
part of the physical takings analysis, not even if the price for the ninety-nine 
percent of the remaining crop were much higher than if the market were not 
regulated.  Protection of certain agricultural markets may require some sort 
of collective action to overcome the free-rider and transaction cost problems 
of an unconstrained, free-for-all market.  In these situations, the race to get 
to market would simply be too great to ensure the protection of farmers’ 
income, the sufficiency and safety of the supply, and an adequate number of 
long-term players.  The benefit to the raisin growers then is not simply the 
higher price but also the collective action that overcomes market failure 
problems. 
Finally, the Court’s application of the per se approach to the reserve 
requirement ignores the complexity and breadth of property.  Comparing 
the seizure of your car to the occupation of your home is too simplistic a 
                                                          
 57.  In Lucas, the Court declared a law causing a total loss of economically viable use to be a 
per se regulatory taking.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015–17 (1992). 
 58.  135 S. Ct. 2419, 2429 (2015) (discussing the conclusion in Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430, 436, 
that the installation of a small cable box was a physical taking despite the continued economic 
viability of the property); see also Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436–38 (stating that traditional rules are in 
place to avoid line-drawing: “constitutional protection for the rights of private property cannot be 
made to depend on the size of the area permanently occupied,” but upon “whether there is a taking 
in the first instance”).   
 59.  In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Justice Holmes noted how a law’s “average 
reciprocity of advantage” had been “recognized as a justification” for the law.  260 U.S. 393, 415 
(1922).  In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, Justice Brennan contrasted a 
physical invasion with “interference aris[ing] from some public program adjusting the benefits 
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).  
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justification for the Court’s adoption of a one-dimensional test.60  This 
superficially persuasive—but misleading—1:1 comparison overlooks the 
wide variety of assets falling outside of the real property category, as well 
as the constant development of new forms of personal property.  By 
classifying the reserve requirement as a per se physical taking, the Court in 
effect defines the property interest as each individual raisin, despite the 
requirement’s role in maintaining the value of the crop as a whole.  A tract 
of land, however, is fixed in its size; the quantity of acreage is known.  If a 
landowner proposes to subdivide the tract into forty lots but is only allowed 
to develop twenty, the landowner still owns the same amount of land.  He 
has not lost his tract or even a part of it.  Agricultural crops produced for 
sale, in contrast, are not fixed in number.  The yield varies from year to 
year, just as the amount of subdivided lots varies depending on the 
circumstances.  The grower cannot fix the quantity of crops grown ex ante, 
making regulatory intervention necessary if a market failure exists.  This 
difference in the variability of the quantity should affect how a property 
interest and a physical taking are defined. 
Because the Horne majority applied the per se test to that part of the 
raisin crop set aside to maintain the market value of the remaining crop, any 
law requiring the physical separation and possible transfer of personal 
property would seem to be a per se physical taking.  What if a law 
mandated the surrender of a firearm by its owner even though the owner 
was not prohibited from possessing the weapon?  In 2014, California 
enacted a law authorizing such action when a judicial officer finds 
reasonable or sufficient cause to believe that the owner poses an immediate 
and present danger of injury.61  Or what if a law authorized local 
governments to seize the personal property of homeless people when the 
property was found in public places?62  Under the Horne Court’s analysis, 
                                                          
 60.  Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2426. 
 61.  2014 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5639–43 (West) (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524).  This law 
was amended in 2015 to add protections for the rights of gun owners against unfair seizures.  2015 
Cal. Legis. Serv. 1653–55 (West). 
 62.  See A Dream Denied: The Criminalization of Homelessness in U.S. Cities, NAT’L COAL. 
FOR THE HOMELESS, http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/crimreport/constitutional.html 
(last visited Sept. 8, 2015) (discussing criminalization measures against the homeless and their 
constitutional implications); Gale Holland, L.A. City Council OKs Crackdowns on Homeless 
Encampments, L.A. TIMES (June 23, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-
homeless-sweeps-20150624-story.html (discussing crackdowns on homeless encampments); Ilya 
Somin, The Takings Clause and Government Destruction of Homeless Persons’ Property, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 6, 2012), http://volokh.com/2012/09/06/the-takings-clause-and-
government-destruction-of-homeless-persons-property/ (discussing the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment implications of government seizure of homeless persons’ property); see, e.g., Lavan 
v. City of L.A., 693 F.3d 1022, 1032–33 (9th Cir. 2012) (upholding the rule that government must 
give a property owner notice and a chance to challenge a taking “regardless of whether the 
property in question is an Escalade or an EDAR, a Cadillac or a cart”); Pottinger v. City of Miami, 
810 F. Supp. 1551, 1570 n.30 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding city’s seizure and destruction of homeless 
persons’ personal property to be a violation of the Fifth Amendment).  But see Sanchez v. City of 
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the possibility of a seizure or transfer of possession would trigger the per se 
physical takings test.  The context of the law and the public interests 
justifying the seizure or transfer could not be considered.  Though the 
Horne Court hoped to provide a clearer and more predictable takings test, it 
instead expanded the application of a test that is divorced from any 
consideration of context.  Not only can the test not handle the many forms 
of personal property, whether tangible or not, it also cannot handle the 
complicated legal regimes that accompany and support these property 
interests.  The Horne decision thus poses a serious dilemma for takings 
jurisprudence. 
Should the differences between the types of property matter under 
takings analysis?  Which takings tests or principles best capture the breadth 
and variability of property interests while minimizing problems of 
inconsistency and unpredictability?  These questions will now be addressed. 
II.  THE PROPERTY PERSPECTIVE 
In deciding whether differences between real and personal property 
matter for purposes of defining constitutionally protected property, it is 
important to focus on the nature of the differences under property law and 
then to ask whether these distinctions should have constitutional 
implications.  Are there reasons flowing from the differences that justify or 
necessitate a more nuanced or context-dependent approach under the 
Takings Clause?  Should a takings test reflect the nature of real and 
personal property and the possibility of emerging property forms?  Should, 
in other words, a takings test reflect the reach and promise of property—its 
richness and frontiers? 
A.  Property’s Breadth and Variability 
Personal property comes in many different sizes, shapes, and forms.  
In contrast to land, personal property has a broad reach and potential for 
evolution.  While real property interests are, by definition, tied to 
permanent, renewable tracts of land having demarcated boundaries, 
personal property may be tangible or intangible, is typically nonrenewable, 
and, in the case of many agricultural products, is perishable.  Some forms of 
personal property are intangible and more conceptual than actual, with the 
boundaries of delineation mainly set through a regulatory regime.  The 
regime and property interests persist because the value of the property far 
outweighs the cost of enforcing these murky conceptual boundaries, 
                                                          
Fresno, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1104 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (holding a homeless plaintiff had no federal 
takings claim when he failed to avail himself of any state procedures for compensation).  
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justifying the enforcement efforts.63  Other types of personal property are 
tangible but fungible—like raisins, making it impossible to identify 
individual units.  Only physical separation can provide a way to distinguish 
different batches.  Personal property that is tangible, fungible, and 
perishable tends to derive its economic value from sale.  Large quantities 
would only be produced for the market.  The greater the sameness, fragility, 
or intangibility, the more the need for management and regulations to draw 
legal boundaries, resolve conflicts, and protect public interests. 
The common law of property traditionally has treated personal 
property differently than real property, varying principles, policies, and 
rules to reflect the nature of the personal property being acquired, used, or 
disputed.  As a general matter, possession-based rules have been more 
important to personal property as ways to acquire and enforce ownership 
rights.64  The title system similarly is less extensive for personal property 
than for real property.  Personal property often lacks the durability of land 
to justify the costs of establishing a formal title system involving 
registration or recordation of title documents.  For many types of personal 
property, possession is the common law’s preferable source of evidence of 
ownership.65  Some more expensive, durable forms—like cars, boats, art, 
and jewelry—have more formal title systems, but they generally are the 
exception.66  For fungible personal property (especially if perishable), 
commercial transactions require use of either an inconvenient system based 
on total physical separation or a more complex system providing for the 
commingling of goods through commercial laws governing warehouse 
arrangements and transfers of documents of title.67 
                                                          
 63.  Intellectual property interests, for example, may be so valuable that the costs of 
enforcement are worth the effort.  The Google Books litigation demonstrates how extensive those 
efforts can be.  See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(concluding that the settlement agreement still goes too far in giving Google significant rights to 
control copyrighted works without permission), vacated 721 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 
Jonathan Stempel, Google Defeats Authors in U.S. Book-Scanning Lawsuit, REUTERS (Nov. 14, 
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/14/us-google-books-idUSBRE9AD0TT 20131114 
(discussing the Google litigation).   
 64.  See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY § 16.2 (3d ed. 2014) (discussing the rule 
of capture for acquiring ownership of wild animals); id. § 16.3 (discussing first possession as a 
requirement of finder’s law, protecting a first possessor over subsequent possessors and third 
parties, with the exception of the true owner); id. (unless embedded in state, federal, or Indian 
lands, a shipwreck is governed by the law of finds, awarding the finder ownership of the ship and 
its contents, or, if the ship has not been abandoned, by the law of salvage, which entitles the finder 
to possession and a reward for salvaged goods, but not title). 
 65.  See, e.g., id. § 2.1 (discussing how a presumption of ownership arises from possession of 
property and exercise of physical control due to the expense and difficulty of proving true 
ownership). 
 66.  See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
901–18 (2d ed. 2012) (discussing various title systems for real and personal property).  
 67.  Article 7 of the U.C.C. governs management of goods for storage and transit, recognizing 
the use of documents of title by warehousemen and financial institutions in the business of storing 
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Recording or registration systems designed to give notice to third 
parties and to establish the priority of various rights-holders are also more 
extensive for real property than for personal property.  Some types of 
personal property that are exchanged in the marketplace and financed by 
lending institutions have registration systems for title and secured financial 
interests.68  For many forms of personal property, though, no formal system 
exists.   
Enforcement of property rights also differs depending on whether the 
property is real or personal.  Trespass to land, for example, is traditionally 
handled harshly and swiftly,69 while trespass to chattel is harder to 
establish.70  Legal regimes for both real and personal property tend to 
become more complex if the asset is highly valued, durable, or able to 
generate financial capital.  Laws regulating oil and gas, for example, began 
simply, borrowing the rule of capture used for wild animals.  Eventually, 
when the rule of capture promoted a race to drill and capture regardless of 
demand or ability to store for the future, the laws for oil and gas became 
much more complicated.71  Now these laws even allow forced pooling to 
gain access to oil and gas on a landowner’s property against her 
objections.72 
                                                          
and handling goods for hire, and delivery of goods.  U.C.C. §§ 7-101–7-704 (AM. LAW INST. & 
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2014).  These documents of title 
include any record “that in the regular course of business or financing is treated as adequately 
evidencing that the person in possession or control of the record is entitled to receive, control, 
hold, and dispose of the record and the goods the record covers.”  U.C.C. § 1-201(16) (AM. LAW 
INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2014).  
 68.  Automobiles, for example, have a registration or title system run by the states and are 
often subject to the interests of secured creditors governed by Article 9 of the U.C.C.  See 
MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 66, at 913–14 (discussing the interaction of the state’s automobile 
title systems with the U.C.C).  
 69.  E.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 166 (Wis. 1997) (upholding 
$100,000 in punitive damages for an intentional trespass to land); see also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 63 (4th ed. 1971) (describing the law of intentional trespass to 
land as “exceptionally simple and exceptionally rigorous” (quoting 1 THOMAS ATKINS STREET, 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 19 (1906))).  
 70.  Trespass to chattel generally requires proof of harm to the owner.  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1965).  Common law differences between 
trespass and nuisance also suggest that the Horne Court overreached in finding a direct physical 
invasion—a trespass-like situation. Under the common law, trespass generally involves an 
intrusion onto land by a tangible object “solid and large enough to physically displace” the 
landowner. Common law courts have tended to treat invasions by small substances (like gas, 
sound, and light waves) as nuisances, not trespasses.  MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 66, at 29.  
 71.  Under the rule of capture, a landowner may drill for oil and gas on his own land and 
eventually may take oil and gas from the same pool extending under neighboring lands. See 
generally NANCY SAINT-PAUL, 1 SUMMERS OIL AND GAS, OWNERS RIGHTS TO TAKE OIL AND 
GAS § 3:2 (2010), Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015).  He would have no liability to 
compensate the adjoining landowner; thus, a landowner has the incentive to drill first and reap the 
benefits of oil and gas that may originate in adjoining lands.  Id. 
 72.  See, e.g., Laura Legere, Forced Pooling Policies Remain Unclear in Pennsylvania’s 
Shale Plays, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Jan. 6, 2015), http://powersource.post-
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One important difference between real and personal property is 
personal property’s greater breadth and ability to evolve into new forms, 
assets, and interests as technological advances occur.  The right to broadcast 
over the airwaves, for example, began informally as customs, practices, and 
norms developed among broadcasters.  When conflicts eventually occurred, 
courts recognized a property interest of sorts under the common law to 
protect the first-in-time broadcaster from interference by another 
broadcaster trying to free-ride on the first user’s signal and reputation.73  
Eventually Congress enacted a more complex regulatory regime governing 
allocation of broadcast rights over the airwaves.74  Even now, technological 
advances continue to lead to new forms of electronic transmissions that 
push the boundaries of our thinking about property rights.75 
Intellectual property more broadly has experienced tremendous change 
over the years because of emerging technologies.  Intellectual property 
scholars continue to debate the choice of legal regime, weighing the 
reliance on use restrictions traditionally favored by the FCC with the 
alternative of recognizing well defined property rights.76  In addition to the 
electromagnetic spectrum, new forms of property are emerging in the 
Internet and the electric power grid.77  These new forms differ in significant 
ways from real property, displaying both significant interdependencies and 
unpredictable geographic discontinuities or sources of disturbances.78  One 
scholar, Christopher Yoo, argues that property theory should focus on these 
                                                          
gazette.com/powersource/policy-powersource/2015/01/06/Forced-pooling-policies-remain-
unclear-in-Pennsylvania-s-shale-plays/stories/201412300017 (discussing the forced pooling 
provisions of a 1961 oil and gas law in the context of hydraulic fracking).  
 73.  E.g., Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broad. Station, Inc. (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1926), reprinted in 68 
CONG. REC. 215 (1926).  
 74.  Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (authorizing the creation of the 
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) with the purpose of “regulating interstate and 
foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio”); 47 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012) (establishing 
minimum standards to reduce interference with radio reception); 47 U.S.C. § 309 (2012) 
(establishing a regime under which broadcast stations apply to receive a license from the FCC). 
 75.  The debate over net neutrality, for example, raises fundamental questions about how to 
approach the Internet—as a commons open generally to all or as a resource to be invested in and 
developed as private property.  See James Grimmelmann, The Internet Is a Semicommons, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2799, 2815–42 (2010) (using economic theory to argue that the Internet should 
be treated as a semicommons).  The recent battle between cable companies and streaming services 
highlights what is at stake.  See generally Adam B. VanWagner, Seeking a Clearer Picture: 
Assessing the Appropriate Regulatory Framework for Broadband Video Distribution, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2909 (2011); Stephen Battaglio, Cable Companies Are Scrambling as More 
Viewers Become Cord-Cutters, L.A. TIMES (May 7, 2015), 
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-cable-companies-cord-cutters-
20150507-story.html.   
 76.  See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Coase: Emerging Technologies and Property Theory, 
160 U. PA. L. REV. 2189 (2012) (explaining the debate from its inception with Ronald Coase to its 
potential future implications for policy and property theory). 
 77.  Id. (discussing the implications of these new forms for property theory).  
 78.  Id. at 2204–07. 
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differences to govern the new forms of property instead of focusing on the 
normal “bargaining-related transaction costs.”79  Under his approach, 
technological interdependencies would be “the key determinant of property 
boundaries.”80  Yoo offers “several lessons for property theory” that 
underscore the evolving nature of property’s frontier.81 
B.  Property’s Management Systems 
If the nature of property matters, a regulation requiring physical 
separation of reserve raisins from free-tonnage raisins should not, in 
isolation, lead to a physical takings finding—at least not when the property 
is fungible, perishable, and deriving much of its value from the prospect of 
sale in a regulated market.  What else might justify the classification of a 
reserve requirement like the one in Horne as a per se physical taking?  In 
addition to physical separation, the Horne majority focused on the transfer 
of title, concluding, without much explanation, that “[t]itle to the raisins 
passes to the Raisin Committee.”82  Chief Justice Roberts noted that reserve 
raisins may, at times, remain on the premises of the handlers, but even then 
the raisins are held ‘“for the account’ of the Government,” which may 
dispose of the reserves “as it wishes.”83  In the majority’s view, the raisin 
growers lose all of their property rights in the reserve raisins.84  The 
growers’ interest in net proceeds is at best a “speculative hope.”85 
The Court’s analysis unnecessarily limits the nature of the property 
arrangement managed and supported by the regulatory regime.  Instead of 
viewing the situation as a transfer of all legal and equitable interests to the 
RAC, the Court could have viewed the arrangement as a transfer of legal 
title to the RAC for the purpose of managing the supply of reserve raisins, 
leaving the equitable interests with the raisin growers, much like a 
beneficiary under a trust.  Custody or possession of the reserve raisins 
generally would remain with the handlers until directed by the RAC to 
dispose of the raisins.  Or the Court could have viewed the transfer as a 
bailment, much as warehouse arrangements initially are viewed under 
commercial law until a transfer of title occurs.86  The equitable or residual 
                                                          
 79.  Id. at 2204. 
 80.  Id.   
 81.  Id.  
 82.  Horne v. USDA, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2015). 
 83.  Id. at 2428 (quoting 7 C.F.R. § 989.66(a) (2015) on the RAC’s general guidelines on 
reserve tonnage).  
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Id.  
 86.  See UNIF. LAW COMM’N, UCC Article 7, Documents of Title (2003) Summary, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=UCC%20Article%207,%20Documents%20
of%20Title%20(2003) (last visited Sept. 8, 2015) (discussing changes to Article 7 of the Uniform 
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interest in the grower would include the right to receive proceeds after 
authorized and legitimate deductions are taken.87  Whether the deductions 
are valid is a separate question.  Though recovery of administrative 
expenses seems reasonable, the subsidies for export handlers are harder to 
justify without probing the subsidies’ relation to the disposal of reserve 
raisins.  The amount of the net proceeds is uncertain, but the regulatory 
scheme clearly leaves the interest in the proceeds with the growers.   
Thus, the Court’s characterization of the transfer is important.  The 
transfer of all interests is very different from the transfer of legal title for 
management purposes.  The RAC needs enough power to manage the 
reserves and achieve its regulatory purpose of stabilizing the raisin market.  
Achieving this goal not only involves controlling the supply but also 
overcoming the strategic behavior of growers in an unrestrained market.  
Any discretion that the RAC has over the reserve raisins should be limited 
by its regulatory purpose, just as a trustee is limited by the terms of the trust 
and relevant trust law.88  The discretion of the RAC is not unlimited, as the 
Court suggests; both statutory and regulatory law provide constraints to 
guide oversight.  Though the RAC has significant gatekeeping powers, they 
are not equivalent to the entire range of an owner’s powers. 
Should the differences in the nature of the property and its 
management system matter for purposes of defining constitutionally 
protected property?  Unless the text or the history of the Takings Clause 
suggest otherwise, both real and personal property are equally deserving of 
protection.  That does not mean, however, that takings jurisprudence should 
ignore the nature of the property interest allegedly taken or its management 
system and supporting infrastructure.  Any approach to constitutionally 
protected property that is one-dimensional would fail to anticipate 
property’s richness and frontiers.  The Court’s opinion in Horne does just 
that by applying a test developed for direct physical seizures of tangible 
property that is ex ante quantifiable and not dependent for its value on a 
regulated market.  Property’s forms and management systems are much 
more complicated and variable. 
Because the history and rhetoric of the Takings Clauses are relevant to 
how different types of property are treated, constitutional protection of 
property will now be placed within a historical context.  This discussion 
will show that the historical compact relied on by the Horne Court is not as 
clear or certain as the Court suggested. 
                                                          
Commercial Code, which relies on the common law concept of bailments enhanced by the use of 
warehouse receipts or documents of title to allow transfers in the marketplace).  
 87.  The regulations authorize deductions for administrative expenses and subsidies to export 
handlers.  7 C.F.R. § 989.66(h) (2015). 
 88.  For a discussion of limitations on the decisions of trustees, see GEORGE GLEASON 
BOGERT ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 551 (2014). 
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III.  THE RHETORIC AND INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE TAKINGS 
CLAUSE 
Proposed as part of the Bill of Rights amending the Constitution of 
1787, the Takings Clause was ratified without much debate or fanfare.  
Other than the reporting of various versions of the Clause and of brief 
debates on the danger of majoritarian exploitation, little direct evidence of 
the Clause’s ratification process exists.89  Although secondary sources of 
the time, like newspapers and pamphlets, published debates on the need for 
constitutional protection of property, those sources generally do not reveal 
information about the ratification process and typically provide only the 
author’s views of property rights and the need for a just compensation 
provision.90 
Because the historical records of the proceedings on the ratification of 
the Takings Clause are nominal, scholars have looked to political debates 
and institutional practices to develop theories of the meaning and purpose 
of the Clause.  Some have tended to focus on the rhetoric surrounding 
property rights, examining political debates over property rights occurring 
during the colonial, revolutionary, and early republican periods.91  Others 
have chosen instead to study the institution of property, paying particular 
attention to the laws affecting property rights, as well as actual practices.92  
                                                          
 89.  See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 
REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 402–04 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) (discussing the fear of 
exploitation); 2 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 361–83 (Neil H. Cogan, ed. 1997) (setting forth 
Madison’s proposed bill and the status of the congressional version eventually adopted).  For a 
good discussion of why the Takings Clause poses “a special problem for the historian of original 
intent,” see Harry N. Scheiber, The “Takings” Clause and the Fifth Amendment: Original Intent 
and Significance in American Legal Development, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS 233–49 (Eugene W. 
Hickok, Jr., ed. 1991).  
 90.  See, e.g., Luther Martin, Genuine Information, No. 8, Jan. 22, 1788, reprinted in THE 
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 89, at 376; The Federal Farmer, No. 6, Dec. 25, 1787, 
reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note, 89 at 375. 
 91.  See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
(1967) (analyzing similarities in argument, language, and invocation of Revolutionary figures in 
Revolutionary-era pamphlets); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY (1990) 
(explaining the significance of property in the American political system by examining the 
Federalist victory at the Constitutional Convention of 1787); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE 
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN 
TRADITION 506–07 (1975) (describing Revolutionary literary themes of “a civic and patriot ideal 
in which the personality was founded in property, perfected in citizenship but perpetually 
threatened by corruption”); David Schultz, Political Theory and Legal History: Conflicting 
Depictions of Property in the American Political Founding, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 464, 467–69, 
477–81 (1993) (“on the rhetorical level property rights were described in ‘absolutist’ terms”). 
 92.  See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 1–
30 (1977) (describing the emergence of an instrumental conception of law); Morton J. Horwitz, 
The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 275, 
286 (1973); Schultz, supra note 91, at 481–83 (explaining the Revolutionary trend of thinking of 
property “as an institution and not simply a concept”).  
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The approach taken—rhetorical or institutional—can affect the meaning 
and reach of the Clause.  Scholars taking the rhetorical approach, for 
example, tend to describe property rights in absolutist terms, relying on the 
forceful statements of Locke, Blackstone, Madison, and others who viewed 
property rights as fundamentally important.93  Scholars following an 
institutional approach, in contrast, tend to look at how property actually was 
treated during America’s formative era to conclude that property rights 
were not absolute, but rather subject to economic regulation and other laws 
adopted to promote the public good.94 
A.  The Rhetorical and Institutional Perspectives 
The differences between the rhetorical and institutional perspectives 
on property developed early in the settlement of America.  During the 
colonial period, the rhetoric of property was very Lockean.  Legal and 
political leaders often described property as fundamental to liberty and as 
arising from natural law.95  The laws, regulations, and actual practices in 
effect at the time, however, suggest that colonists generally accepted the 
notion that government could limit property rights.96  Indeed, soon after 
America was settled, colonial governments began to regulate land use.97  
Colonists apparently understood that the regulation of property was 
necessary to promote economic development and achieve other important 
social goals.98  Despite the strong rhetoric of property, colonists became 
accustomed to holding property rights subject to the public good.99  As one 
commentator observed, “British common law, colonial and early American 
regulatory policies, and case law all sustained significant limits on property 
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 98.  Schultz, supra note 91, at 488. 
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rights that contrasted dramatically with the political rhetoric of property 
during this era.”100  This apparent conflict between rhetoric and practice 
complicates the task of defining the meaning and scope of the Takings 
Clause. 
Land use regulation in colonial America applied to a wide range of 
purposes and uses.101  In addition to regulation of agricultural uses,102 
colonial governments regulated noxious land uses,103 enclosure of lands,104 
mining,105 uses of waterfront land,106 drainage of wetlands,107 and the 
location of bakeries, slaughterhouses, stills, and other business 
operations.108  Colonial laws also regulated fishing, fowling, and hunting, 
sometimes even preserving public rights to pursue those uses on privately 
owned lands.109  Further, in urban areas, colonial laws often engaged in 
community planning by adopting public safety regulations,110 regulating 
aesthetics and location of uses,111 imposing clean up obligations on urban 
landowners,112 and encouraging the development of land.113 
Land distribution laws enacted during the colonial period also imposed 
conditions and restrictions on interests acquired under those laws.  To 
encourage settlement and development, the laws typically imposed clearing, 
seating, and planting requirements on parties seeking a land patent.114  
Basically, the parties had to clear the land and build a house or otherwise 
affirmatively use the land before they acquired a land patent.115  If a party 
failed to fulfill all the conditions for securing a patent, the party lost 
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whatever interest had been acquired during the patenting process.116  
Further, if the party failed to meet conditions imposed after the patent was 
issued, the party might forfeit the title.117 
During the colonial era, governments often used the power of eminent 
domain to acquire land for buildings and roads.118  The colony of 
Massachusetts, for example, authorized towns to condemn land for 
highways,119 South Carolina allowed the appropriation of land for the 
construction of buildings and roads,120 and Maryland permitted land to be 
taken for the construction of tobacco inspection warehouses.121  Rhode 
Island authorized the appropriation of private property to construct a pest 
house,122 and Virginia allowed iron factories to cut and take timber from the 
land of adjacent property owners.123  In many colonies, laws authorized 
private parties to appropriate land for the construction of watermills.124 
Whether just compensation was awarded when property was taken for 
public purposes is the subject of much debate.  Some scholars, like 
Professor James Ely, have argued that the just compensation principle was 
well established in England at the time of the colonization of America and 
that colonial governments generally recognized this principle.125  As 
support, Ely points to a number of colonial governments that required 
                                                          
 116.  See BUTLER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 109, § 8.5, at 283–87 (discussing the nature of 
the interest acquired before a patent was issued). 
 117.  Hart, supra note 101, at 1260–63. 
 118.  See BOSSELMAN, CALLIES, & BANTA, supra note 97, at 92–93 (describing generally the 
colonial precursors to the eminent domain clause); ELY, supra note 93, at 24 (discussing the 
colonial practice of eminent domain). 
 119.  The General Laws and Liberties of the Massachusetts Colony, 1672, reprinted in 2 THE 
LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS, 1641–1691, at 290 (Scholarly Resources, Inc. 1976). 
 120.  The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, reprinted in 1 STATUTES AT LARGE OF 
SOUTH CAROLINA 48 (Thomas Cooper ed., 1836). 
 121.  LAWS OF MARYLAND AT LARGE, WITH PROPER INDEXES ch. 18, § 36 (Thomas Brown 
ed., 1765); see also James W. Ely, Jr., “That Due Satisfaction May Be Made:” The Fifth 
Amendment and the Origins of the Compensation Principle, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 6 (1992). 
 122.  See Ely, supra note 121, at 5. 
 123.  An Act for Encouraging Adventures in Iron-Works, ch. XLVI, 1748 Va. Laws., reprinted 
in 6 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE 
FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, ch. XLVI (William Waller Hening ed., 
1819) (encouraging adventurers in ironworks); see also An Act for Encouraging Adventures in 
Iron-Works, ch. XII, 1727 Va. Laws., reprinted in 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A 
COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN 
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payment of compensation for the construction of highways or buildings.126  
Ely concedes that the colonies were not consistent in actually paying 
compensation but notes that compensation would not need to be paid until 
improvements were made, and often improvements did not occur.127  He 
also notes that the abundance and cheapness of land made payment of 
compensation for unimproved land less important; undeveloped land 
usually had insignificant monetary value and was always available.128 
Professor William Michael Treanor, on the other hand, maintains that 
the compensation principle was not generally accepted during the colonial 
era.129  He explains that republican theory controlled thinking about 
property rights at this time.  Under republican theory, property rights were 
held subject to the public good.130  According to Treanor, the most common 
type of taking for the public good occurred when land was appropriated for 
the construction of public roads.  Yet, “[e]xcept for Massachusetts, no 
colony appears to have paid compensation when it built a state-owned road 
across unimproved land.”131  Further, uncompensated takings of personal 
property seemed fairly common.  Virginia, for example, protected its 
reputation as a tobacco producer by authorizing the uncompensated seizure 
of tobacco of inferior quality.132  A provision in Massachusetts’s 1641 Body 
of Liberties, in contrast, provided for compensation but only for the seizure 
of personal property.133  Treanor concedes, though, that colonial 
governments provided compensation when enclosed or improved land was 
taken.134 
Morton Horwitz, in The Transformation of American Law, agrees with 
Treanor that the compensation principle “was not widely established in 
America at the time of the Revolution.”135  He notes that only colonial 
Massachusetts consistently provided compensation for road construction.136  
Other colonies either limited the compensation to land that was already 
improved or enclosed or did not regularly provide compensation.137  Indeed, 
the courts in a few colonies denied compensation for road construction until 
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the nineteenth century, reasoning that original land grants expressly 
reserved land for building public roads.138 
B.  The Movement for Reform 
The revolutionary period saw increased government infringement of 
property rights and greater redistribution of wealth.  Common practices 
included the seizure of loyalists’ property, the appropriation of debts owed 
to British merchants, and the imposition of size limitations on the sale of 
seized land.139  Many creditors fell victim to the use of depreciated paper 
money printed to aid debtors.140  Eventually, as the assault on property 
became more intense, provisions protecting property rights were 
incorporated into national laws and state constitutions.  The first national 
law requiring compensation for property taken for public use was the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787.141 Responding to fears that a territorial 
legislature would rescind earlier land grants, the ordinance provided for full 
compensation of property taken for public purposes. It declared:  
[N]o man shall be deprived of his liberty or property but by the 
judgment of his Peers, or the law of the land; and should the 
public exigencies make it necessary for the common preservation 
to take any persons property, . . . full compensation shall be made 
for the same.142 
States also began adding provisions protecting property to their 
constitutions.  The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 declared “acquiring, 
possessing and protecting property” to be part of the “natural, inherent and 
unalienable [sic] rights” of all men and provided that “no part of a man’s 
property can be justly taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his 
own consent, or that of his legal representatives.”143  The Massachusetts 
Constitution of 1780 went a step further, providing for reasonable 
compensation.144  The movement to provide greater constitutional 
protection of property rights thus gained considerable strength during the 
revolutionary era. 
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Concerned about the “future security of property,”145 Madison 
ultimately stepped forward with an amendment to protect property rights.  
In a speech to the first Congress in 1789, Madison proposed adoption of a 
provision that stated, “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor be obliged to relinquish his 
property, where it may be necessary for public use, without a just 
compensation.”146  Congress responded with a different version that 
eventually was ratified in 1791.147  The records of the congressional debate 
over the Bill of Rights do not reveal any reasons for the change in 
wording.148  Nor is there any written evidence of significant opposition to 
either version.149 
In an essay written shortly after ratification of the Bill of Rights, 
Madison presented his vision of property and its relationship to the 
constitutional order.  He maintained that government is “instituted to 
protect property of every sort” and defined a “just government” as one 
“which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own.”150  
Consistent with this definition, he concluded that property is not secure 
“where arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to part of 
its citizens that free use of their faculties, and free choice of their 
occupations, which not only constitute their property in the general sense of 
the word; but are the means of acquiring property strictly so called.”151  Nor 
did he believe that a “just security to property” was afforded by the 
government when, according to Madison, “unequal taxes oppress one 
species of property and reward another species: where arbitrary taxes 
invade the domestic sanctuaries of the rich, and excessive taxes grind the 
faces of the poor.”152  Maintaining the “inviolability of property” required 
that property could not be “taken directly even for public use” without 
compensation; a government that “indirectly violates . . . property” was not, 
in Madison’s view, “a pattern for the United States.”153 
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Early physical takings cases dealt with real and personal property: 
guns, horses, supplies, wagons, boats, land, and so on.154  A review of the 
Court’s precedent reveals the nuanced reasoning of those early cases that 
was used for both real and personal property.  Traditional physical takings 
cases examined the character of the government action, the degree of 
physicality, the impact of the government action on the use value of the 
property, the degree of permanence of the invasion, the existence of a 
conflicting public right, and the strength of the causal link between the 
government action and the impact.155  The focus was not just on the 
existence of a physical invasion or seizure; the analysis was more complex 
and nuanced.  It was not until the 1900s—after the Court developed the 
regulatory takings doctrine and announced an ad hoc factor or balancing 
test—that the Court described the physical takings test in the unequivocal 
and simplistic terms of a per se rule.156 
IV.  PROTECTING THE PROMISE AND REACH OF PROPERTY: SOME 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Differences should matter—not in deciding whether types of property 
are worthy of protection, but rather in developing and applying principles 
under the regulatory and physical takings concepts.  On the surface, the 
clarity of a simplistic, one-size-fits-all test is appealing.  Applying such a 
crude test, however, will lead to shoehorning, inconsistent results, and little 
predictive value.157  The Horne Court’s own language shows the fallacy of 
its per se logic.  The Court declares that a categorical duty to pay applies to 
the seizure of an owner’s car just as much as to her home, and then applies 
that approach to each individual raisin of a grower’s crop.  It did not matter 
that the reserve requirement was the price of entry into a regulated market 
set up to protect the value of the grower’s crop as a whole.  Yet later the 
Court distinguishes a case involving a requirement that chemical companies 
disclose trade secrets—which the Court concedes are property—in 
exchange for a permit to sell hazardous chemicals, reasoning that the 
companies received a special government benefit in the course of a 
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voluntary exchange.158  Under the per se approach, however, the strength of 
the public interest and the benefits received by the property owner are not 
part of the takings calculus.  By its own logic, the Court thus demonstrates 
how context dependent the takings calculus is. 
Would, for example, the government’s seizure of a car used in the 
commission of a crime constitute a per se physical taking?  Would the 
answer change if the owner were not involved in the crime or if the seizure 
of the car was instead due to the driver’s failure to pay a traffic ticket?  
Would the government’s destruction of a home be a physical taking if the 
action was taken to help prevent the spread of a fire?  When exactly can a 
court consider the public interest or the benefits received by the property 
owner in deciding whether a government seizure or appropriation is a 
physical taking? 
In Horne, the property context is not as clear as the Court suggests.  
Had the government seized all or part of a tract of agricultural land to 
protect the price of the crop by taking some land out of production, a 
physical taking clearly would exist.  Actual seizure of the land would 
deprive the landowner of all rights in that land.  But a more complex 
question is presented by a requirement to set aside a portion of a fungible 
crop in years when the supply from all growers is too bountiful to maintain 
the price at an economically viable level.  Growers enter the regulated 
market with their eyes wide open, knowing that the size of the crop cannot 
be controlled ex ante and therefore that some sort of government 
management of the supply side is needed to protect their enterprise.  They 
enter the regulated market knowing that the reserve requirement reflects 
market conditions.  They benefit from being in a protected market because 
it adds value to their product by stabilizing price.  They, in other words, 
derive economic value from being in the regulated market precisely because 
of the value stabilization function of the reserve requirement.  The fruit of 
their labors is not just derived from the growers, as the Court suggests, but 
also from the government’s regulatory program.159  At the very least, when 
a property owner cannot control the supply of his fungible, perishable crop, 
the Court should consider whether the crop owner received reciprocity of 
advantage from being in a regulated market.  In such a context, the Court 
should ask whether the crop owner came out ahead—despite any loss from 
the reserve raisins—because of the price received on the competitive market 
for the free tonnage raisins. 
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Some forms of property rights and arrangements are better managed 
under a governance strategy and thus analyzed under a more nuanced 
takings test that allows consideration of the reasons for the management 
regime.  A governance strategy “involves a more complicated and detailed 
set of rules and norms.  Greater specificity of practices and monitoring” of 
uses may be needed because of the nature of the resources being used or 
produced and the range of interests in the resources.160  The Horne case 
identifies one such context—when property rights are protected and 
supported by a regulatory infrastructure providing value stabilization.  A 
per se approach totally ignores the complexities of this context. 
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